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ABSTRACT: Today’s infrastructural systems are expected to be safe and resilient. In this context, 
assessment of such systems faces two principal challenges: common approaches in risk assessment have 
reached their limits in methodology and feasibility in assessing complex and interconnected systems. On 
the other hand, resilience assessment is in its beginnings and lacks, e.g., a commonly accepted resilience 
metric. The paper starts to specify a practical definition of resilience and assigned metric: Resilience is 
characterised by influencing recovery properties of a socio-technical system. Actors and actions are car-
riers of these properties. This corresponds to the views of system representation by Use Case Diagrams 
(UCD). In order to quantify an UCD, actions are validated by assessing their compliance level L. Actors 
are associated with their abilities to respond, monitor, learning, and to anticipate developments. The 
result is given by the Resilience Priority Value REPV = L ⋅ I of  actors and overall system. The resilience 
assessment process is exemplified by a case study of a car park guidance system.
organisations and enterprises (mainly small to mid-
sized enterprises SME). Hence, any resilience assess-
ment approach needs to cover additional demands 
(cf. (ISO-31010 2009)), which might be unimportant 
to basic research. A major concern of organisation 
is method efficiency. Thus, the resilience assessment 
approach as introduced in this paper aims to finally 
reach practicability as known in basic risk assess-
ment audits, fire and explosion inspections, annual 
tests of vehicle safety (Ministry of Transport (MOT) 
test), among others. According to the author’s expe-
rience, such a system analysis must be typically per-
formed from one person in about one day.
There are already exhaustive literature surveys 
on terminology of resilience, where the most com-
mon understanding of resilience is exemplified 
by Scholz et al. (2012): Resilience is the ability of 
the system to adjust its functioning […] following 
changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain 
required operations.
Hosseini et al. (2016) also consider system 
recovery abilities as crucial part of resilience, where 
recovery is the capability of a system to absorb and 
adapt to disruptive events.
Lay et al. (2015) labour characteristics and abili-
ties of resilient systems in more detail, which is 
finally the definition as used in this paper:
definition 1 (resilience) characterises the abilities 
of a system to respond to disturbances, to monitor, 
to learn and to anticipate developments.
With this, resilience belongs to a set of 
related engineering terms characterising system 
capabilities by attributes or system performance 
function P(t), e.g., availability A(t):
1 INTRODUCTION
Current infrastructural systems show a high level of 
complexity and technical development will further 
strengthen this trend. As consequence, such sys-
tems will become increasingly difficult to handle for 
system operating organisations (private and non-
private) and managers involved. It already looks as 
that methodological or practicable limits of, e.g., 
established risk assessment approaches have been 
reached. New terms reflecting newly desired system 
properties (e.g., resilience, smartness) are emerg-
ing too. However, the methodology of resilience 
assessment is in an early stage of development and 
not (yet) in the focus of most organisations. This 
is also due to the lack of a practicable, quantita-
tive metric of resilience. In this context, the paper 
presents an approach to facilitate applied resilience 
assessment audits. Following the concept of system 
representation and resilience quantification, the 
remaining paper is structured as follows: Chapter 2 
defines resilience and terms in use. The results of a 
literature survey on resilience definitions in speci-
fied engineering domains are given in Chapter 3. In 
Chapter 4, resilience assessment is utilised by using 
quantified Use Case Diagrams (UCD). The case 
study presented in Chapter  5  serves to proof the 
concept. The paper closes with discussion of pro 
and cons of approach and context.
2 TERMS
The view in applied research and development in 
resilience analysis covers the requirements of users in 
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Definition 2 (Availability) is the probability of 
finding an unit in an operational condition at time t.
This definition of availability follows, e.g., 
DINEN61703 (2002). Note that A(t) encompasses 
maintenance, which is a system ability to respond 
to disturbances (failures, incidents, over-fulfilment, 
etc.), to monitor them (failure identification) and 
to learn (optimising maintenance processes) and 
anticipate trends (expected failures). The latter is 
covered by reliability management processes and 
preventive maintenance. So far, resilience looks 
like the generalisation of availability towards the 
analysis of extended socio-technological systems. 
Furthermore, management and associated proc-
esses are considered as an integral part of such a 
system in resilience assessment (cf. (Leksin et al. 
2018)). By contrast, management tends to play the 
role of an external controller in risk assessment. 
Business continuity (BC) also follows the concept 
of system recovery but concentrating on business 
impacts:
Definition 3 (Business Continuity) is a corporate 
capability. This capability exists whenever organisa-
tions can continue to deliver their products and serv-
ices at acceptable predefined levels after disruptive 
incidents have occurred (cf. ISO 22301: 2012).
Resilience is in line with established approaches 
to manage deviations, e.g., risk management 
according to ISO-31000 (2009). Note, that any 
system assessment approaches cover the sub-
processes of event identification, analysis and 
evaluation. The view of resilience, availability and 
business continuity is to describe system capabili-
ties with associated performance functions where 
risk relates to (undesired) events.
3 STATE OF THE ART
The following results of a survey on resilience defi-
nitions concentrates around engineering domains 
which are then used to reason the way of utilisation 
of resilience assessment as proposed in Chapter 4. 
Hosseini et al. (2016) give an extended review of 
definitions. They state that the engineering domain 
“includes technical systems designed by engineers 
that interact with humans and technology, such as 
electric power networks”. There, engineering resil-
ience is defined in various points of views:
-	 Sum of the passive survival rate (reliability) and 
proactive survival rate (restoration) of a system.
-	 “Intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its func-
tioning prior to, during, or following changes 
and disturbances, so that it can sustain required 
operations under both expected and unexpected 
conditions” (Hollnagel et al. 2010).
-	 “Infrastructure resilience is the ability to reduce 
the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive 
events. The effectiveness of a resilient infra-
structure or enterprise depends upon its ability 
to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly 
recover from a potentially disruptive event” 
(NIAC 2009).
-	 Factors, e.g., minimisation of failure, limitation 
of effects, administrative controls/procedures, 
flexibility, controllability, early detection.
Furthermore, Hosseini et al. (2016) state that:
-	 Many definition focus on the capability of sys-
tem to absorb and to adapt to disruptive events, 
and recovery is considered as the critical part of 
resilience.
-	 For engineered systems, reliability is considered 
to be an important feature (e.g. nuclear power 
systems).
-	 Returning to steady state performance is needed 
for resilience; some definitions do not impose 
that the system returns to the pre-disaster state 
(e.g. infrastructure).
-	 Multidimensionality and threat-dependency of 
resilience definitions.
These lists and the findings of Chapter 2 sub-
stantiate: Resilient systems show abilities to 
preparedness and recovery in general. Then, pre-
paredness is typically covered by a descriptive 
(i.e. qualitative) and case specific set of attributes 
max ( ) ( ) ( )( , )x f x g x h x∈ ∞ − −0 . System perform-
ance P(t) uses various modelling and simulation 
approaches to model system dynamics and per-
formance P(t) according to the resilience triangle 
concept. Definition of preparedness attributes 
follows methods to design and evaluate question-
naires, check lists, etc., and graphs represent rela-
tionships of system abilities. This notation is useful 
to characterise the common approaches of resil-
ience system analysis:
-	 Attributive: Starting point is the compilation 
of system specific attributes A = …{ }a a an1 2, , , , 
which characterises the presence of or impact on 
resilience properties, e.g., awareness, flexibility, 
risk management, competence, and redundancy. 
Then, analysis follows methods to evaluate ques-
tionnaires, check lists, etc. or uses any graphs to 
represent relationships.
-	 Performance: System performance modelling 
needs the specification of time dependent and 
system specific performance measurements, e.g., 
availability (i.e. function showing the alterna-
tion of operation and maintenance), returns 
(money), among others. Note that P(t) already 
comprises the recovery properties. Modelling 
parameters of might base on A.  Hence, P(t) can 
be modelled by graph theory, (e.g. Markovian 
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models, system dynamics, state diagrams), clas-
sical mechanics considering damped harmonic 
oscillation, (i.e., spring model) as well as control 
theory using proportional–integral–derivative 
controller (PID controller).
The definition of resilience performance P(t) 
results in generic system statements:
-	 max P t b∆ ( ){ } :  There is a specified band 
width b (i.e. defined upper and lower perform-
ance levels) which defines system operability 
(Mock and Zipper 2017).
-	 P(t) = 0: Total system failure (worst case) which 
ends reparability. Recovery is not possible and 
system re-construction is equivalent to a differ-
ent and thus new system. Reconstruction is only 
possible by supporting measures of the superior 
system (cf. definition of disaster). Hence, P(t) = 
0 is associated with fully operable (new) system 
which is a common boundary condition in reli-
ability analysis.
-	 P(t) = k and P t( ) = 0 :  Nominal operation on 
constant performance level k.
-	 P t( ) ≠ 0 :  System is in resilience mode.
-	 P t( ) ≠ 0 :  Acceleration of performance altera-
tion is an indicator of resilience request.
In summary, there is no common under-
standing of resilience and how to model resil-
ience. Many authors define key abilities of 
resilience by their own. The lowest common 
denominator is the ability of a resilient system to 
respond to disturbances and, hence, functional 
preserving capabilities (i.e. recovery). In order 
to verify these findings, Table  1 uses Def.  1 of 
resilience to allocate the specified attributes of 
resilience for infrastructure systems as named in 
references.
Table  1 also shows that “respond” to distur-
bance is the main property of a resilient system. 
The remaining properties are less frequently listed. 
From the author’s point of view, this table exempli-
fies the uncertainty of how to deal with resilience 
key capabilities other than “respond”, and that it 
is still necessary to utilise the resilience concept for 
concrete applications.
Table 1. Key abilities of resilience for infrastructure systems.
System Respond Monitor Learn Anticipate Reference
System homeland  
security
robustness,  
consequence  
mitigation
threat and hazard  
assessments
adaptability,  
harmonisation  
od purposes,  
comprehensive  
of scope
risk-informed  
planning and  
investment
(Hosseini et al.  
2016)
Telecommuni- 
cation network
maintainability reliability, safety,  
confidentiality,  
availability,  
integrity  
performance
– – (Hosseini et al.  
2016)
Communication  
network
defend, remediate,  
recover
detect, diagnose refine – (Hosseini et al.  
2016)
Infrastructure  
system
absorb, recover – adabt anticipate (Lay et al. 2015)
Critical  
infrastructure
responsiveness, timely  
recovery, minimum  
level of service while  
undergoing changes,  
flexibility
– – coordinated 
planning
(Lay et al. 2015)
Infrastructure  
network
ability to regain a  
previous state
– adopt the stress– 
strain model
– (Bergström et al. 
2015)
Infrastructure recovery  
(bouncing back)
– – – (Lundberg and  
Johansson  
2015)
Critical  
infrastructures
robustness,  
(availability of  
redundancy,  
resourcefulness  
and efficiency of  
supporting   
measures)
– – – (BABS 2013)
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4 UTILISATION
Chapter 4 identifies the interrelationships among 
system elements by UCD and how to quantify sys-
tem resilience by attributes as given in Def. 1.
4.1 Use Case Diagram UCD
The Unified Modeling Language (UML) is a quasi-
standard of system representing diagrams offering 
conformance in syntax and semantics. UML 2.5 
defines thirteen types of diagrams, divided into three 
major categories: Structure Diagrams, Behaviour 
Diagrams, and Interaction Diagrams (cf. www.uml.
org) UML diagrams are standardised by (ISO-19501 
2005), where UCD is the most simple structure dia-
gram in UML. This Chapter gives a short introduc-
tion into the concept of UCD by referencing to the 
mentioned standard unless otherwise stated.
Definition 4 (Use case) is a kind of classifier rep-
resenting a coherent unit of functionality provided 
by a system, a subsystem, or a class as manifested by 
sequences of messages exchanged among the system 
(subsystem, class) and one or more outside interac-
tors (called actors) together with actions performed 
by the system (subsystem, class).
A use case is shown as an ellipse containing the 
name of the use case which characterises activities 
of actors.
Definition 5. “An [actor] defines a coherent set of 
roles that users of an entity can play when interact-
ing with the entity. An actor may be considered to 
play a separate role with regard to each use case with 
which it communicates”.
The standard stereotype icon for an actor is a 
“stick man” figure with the name of the actor.
There are three types of relationships among 
use cases (actions) and association
-	 Association: The participation of an actor in a 
use case. In Figure 1, associations are shown by 
solid lines.
-	 Extend: An extend relationship from use case A 
to use case B indicates that an instance of use 
case B may be augmented (subject to specific 
conditions specified in the extension) by the 
behaviour specified by A.
-	 Include: An include relationship from use case 
E to use case F indicates that an instance of the 
use case E will also contain the behaviour as 
specified by F.
-	 Generalisation: A generalisation from use case C 
to use case D indicates that C is a specialisation 
of D.
The author considers UCDs as especially use-
ful for resilience assessment purposes in order to 
depict actors and associated actions on technical 
and organisational level (i.e., modelling socio-tech-
nical systems).
4.2 Semi-quantified resilience assessment 
by UCD
Establishing the resilience assessment audits at 
organisations needs an approach which is resource 
saving and follows established ways of system rep-
resentation, e.g., by UML. In a first step, it is sug-
gested to use the interrelationships among system 
elements by UCD and to assess system resilience 
by means of the resilience attributes as given in 
Def. 1. As mentioned above, the UCD differenti-
ates between actors and actions. In engineering 
terms, actions can be evaluated by assessing their 
level of compliance with standards, best practices, 
etc. It is assumed that a high compliance level has 
a positive effect on the system resilience. Actors 
are the carriers of system resilience where their 
impact on recovery abilities is evaluated. For this, 
the Resilience Priority Value REPV of  an actor is 
introduced, which uses the definition of resilience 
as given in Def. 1: 
REPV L I d m l a= ⋅ ( ), , , ,  (1)
where
-	 REPV: Resilience Priority Value of an actor
-	 L: compliance fulfilment level of an use case 
(action)
-	 I: impact of recovery ability of an actor
-	 d, m, l, a: actor’s abilities to respond distur-
bances, to monitor, to learn and to anticipate.
All assessments use ordinal scales of range [1, 2, 
…, 10], where 1 indicates best and 10 worst cases. 
The concept follows the familiar idea of estimat-
ing risk priority figures, even if  resilience is under-
stood as a positive system property.
So far, the assessment of L is the result of audits 
and expert judgement about the proven record of 
reached compliance levels of actions or associated 
technology, e.g., the operation of IT security man-
agement. In the best case, the rating of L bases on 
already available reports of compliance certifica-
tions, e.g., according to ISO/IEC-27002 (2005).
Actors are considered as the intrinsic carriers 
of resilience. As mentioned above and following 
Def. 1, the impact of recovery ability I depends on 
four attributes, which are rated by ordinal scales 
of range [1, 2, …, 10]. I(d, m, l, a) of an actor is 
assessed by the mean value of these abilities. The 
abilities of learning l and anticipation a are cur-
rently covered by humans. However, trends in 
smart manufacturing and artificial intelligence 
blur this classification.
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The analysis of system resilience needs rules to 
make use of UCD. For a very first proof of con-
cept, the following procedural steps are defined:
1. An estimated compliance fulfilment level Li,e of  
i k= …1 2, , ,  is assigned to each use case Ui.
2. Considering relationships for assessing Li of  Ui
– Apply the mean value of all incoming extend 
associations
– Apply the mean value of all values assigned 
to outgoing include associations
– Compute the mean of both values
3. Rounded off  to the next integer
4. Repeat the process until all use cases (actions) 
are assessed.
In summary, every use case (action) Uc is charac-
terised by a number of extend and include relation-
ships R (i.e., edges): U R Rc c ext c inc; ;;( ) . For further 
resilience computation, only subsets of relation-
ships are needed. For this, every Uc is assessed by 
the mean values x  of  compliance levels L of  asso-
ciated incoming extend relationships and outgoing 
include relationships, i.e. U x xc L c L c Lin ex out incl; ; ;; .− −( )  
The mean of both values finally gives the looked 
for compliance level LUc  of  an action.
Next, every actor A j kj , , , ,= …1 2  is evaluated 
by the following rules:
1. Assign values of I d m l aj j j j j, , ,( )
2. Compute the mean of assigned values in Ij 
which is the looked for impact value of recovery 
ability of an actor Ij,a.
Then every actor shows an impact value Ij, a 
and is assigned with a use case value Li (if  there 
are more than two associations use the mean value 
of Li’s). With that, all values are given to compute 
REPVJ as defined in Eq.  1. System resilience is 
estimated by the mean value of all actors’ REPV 
and again rounded of to next integer.
4.3 Proposed audit process
The utilisation process of resilience assessment is 
finalised by auditing a system. The following steps 
roughly structure such an audit:
-	 Step 1 – Drafting use cases and actors of socio-
technical system to be audited
-	 Step 2 – Transfer of use cases and actors into the 
UCD
-	 Step 3 – Quantification of UCD
-	 Step 4 – Evaluation of results and REPV.
Steps 1 and 2 follow the basic steps of creating 
any UCDs. In terms of risk and resilience assess-
ment Step 1 covers the identification process and 
Step 3 the analysis process. The resulting REPVs 
might be evaluated by a matrix or threshold 
approaches as known in risk assessment. However, 
this step is not elaborated in this paper.
The suggested resilience audit process opens 
developments towards semi-automated processes 
to support auditors. The generation of UCDs is 
a well-known activity in software engineering and 
there are many tools available to do that (cf. Chap-
ter 5). The computation process of UCDs follows 
ideas of using complexity metrics as common to 
characterise computer codes and associated UMLs 
(cf. (Mock et al. 2015)). Altogether, it is intended to 
develop the following audit supporting steps: The 
auditor has to identify actions and actors for UCD 
generation. Both aspects are plant or system spe-
cific. However, there are repetitive elements, e.g., 
associated with IT security, fire and explosion pro-
tection, and occupational safety. These elements 
are typically standardised and subject of compli-
ance checks. Frequently occurring or, e.g., indus-
try branch specific actions and actors can thus be 
deposited in a tool library. An auditor then selects 
the appropriate ones by a drop down menu.
In a next step, the auditor has to identify and 
create the relationships among actions and actors. 
This step is tool supported too.
Finally the auditor needs to input the estimated 
impact values I for every action with only one rela-
tionship and to assign I d m l aj j j j j, , ,( )  for every 
actor. The remaining computations will be done 
by the tool.
In the end, the auditor needs more knowledge in 
system relationships as, e.g., for filling check lists 
or to perform an FMEA. On the other hand, the 
usual actions and actors as well as associated Ij, a 
and Li ratings should be known by an experienced 
auditor as they are close to common checks and 
results of site-specific compliance checks.
5 CASE STUDY: CAR PARK GUIDANCE
The audited system in this case study is a car park 
guidance system as implemented in a Swiss city. 
The system is designed to manage and optimise 
car traffic flow between a parking lot outside town 
(“Castle”) and a car park building in city centre. 
(“Town”). All parking spaces are equipped with 
sensors, networked and controlled by a Super-
visory Control and Data Acquisition system 
(SCADA). Parking space allocation is visible for 
drivers by displays in “Town”.
Step 1 – Drafting actors and use cases
The actors are defined by
-	 Driver (Family): The family is on a getaway. 
The Driver (Family) speaks German and 
strictly follows the parking guiding displays in 
1198
order to avoid looking for parking space. The 
Driver (Family) first drives to the display at the 
car park in the city.
-	 Driver (Tourist: The foreign Driver (Tourist 
does not understand German and feels uncon-
fident with display symbols. Hence, this driver 
ignores the parking guiding displays and makes 
ad-hoc decisions where to park.
-	 Car Park Operator (Town): There are no 
specifications about sensors. Car Park Opera-
tor (Town) is assumed to be responsible for car 
park and system operation. The operator might 
start parking place managing activities.
-	 Parking Lots Operator (Castle): There are no 
specifications. Parking Lots Operator (Cas-
tle) is assumed to be responsible for 84 parking 
lots and system operation. The operator might 
start parking place managing activities.
Actions (use cases) are defined as
-	 Display: The only car parking display is located 
at the car park “City” in town and shows the 
number of free parking spaces at “City” (max. 
340) and “Castle” (two parking spaces small and 
big: 10 + 74 = 84) nearby the Castle. It is assumed 
that display hardware does not fail at any time 
within the observation period of 4.5 years of 
operation. The associated system software is 
remotely updated and patched via Internet.
-	 Gateway: Kerlink LoRa IoT Station (2 identical 
stations) “is an industrial solution suitable for 
people who want to mount the gateway outside 
and who have sufficient technical skills to connect, 
mount and maintain the device themselves. … 
somewhat older software, that is being used, [and] 
this device will do the job. A trained software engi-
neer will be able to update the device using the 
[firm] software” (source: thethingsnetwork.org). 
The Gateways link the 84 Sensors(Castle) with 
the Internet by the Swisscom Mobile network.
-	 Sensors (Castle): The “Fastpark Flush-
Mounted Sensor” (in total 84 sensors) are part 
of Parking Management System (PMS). “The 
wireless system uses smart sensors installed in 
parking spaces and guides drivers to areas with 
vacancies via electronic panels …” (source: 
www.worldsensing.com). The Sensors(Castle) 
are linked with associated Gateways and Park-
ing Management System PMS(Castle). Sensors 
might fail but are not maintained in observation 
time. The sensors are battery operated and uses 
the novel Low Power Wide Area (LPWA) tech-
nology for gateway communication.
-	 PMS Operation: PMS operation and associated 
data storage is done by a separated EU comput-
ing centre.
-	 Sensors (Town): There are no specifications 
about sensors of car boxes. It is only assumed 
that there are sensors which provide display 
data.
-	 PMS (Castle): SCADA device in order to proc-
ess and monitor data from Sensors(Castle). 
The SCADA serves as Human Machine Inter-
face (HMI). The operator is considered as an 
integral part of PMS (Castle) who then might 
startparking place managing activities.
Step 2 – Creating UCD
Information on actors and actions is used to build 
up the UCD of Figure 1. The software tool Plan-
tUML (www.plantuml.com) creates UCDs from 
textual inputs. It is a plug-in, e.g., of Eclipse. The 
possibility of integrating PlantUML into various 
software development frameworks is considered as 
pre-condition for further resilience software tool 
development.
Step 3 – Quantification of UCD
Table 2  shows the quantification of UC as given 
in Figure 1.
Computation in Table 2 is exemplified by con-
sidering the Action U8: The auditor estimates and 
Figure 1. UCD of case study.
Table 2. Estimation of compliance fulfilment level Li by 
use case (actions) Ui.
i Action Ui Li, e Li
 1 Sensors Castle 8 = L1, e
 2 Gateways – 8
 3 Internet 9 = L3, e
 4 IT Security 8 = L4, e
 5 EU Comp. Centre 9 = L5, e
 6 Operates sensors in build. 9 = L6, e
 7 Low power WA 9 = L7, e
 8 Operates PMS – 9
 9 Display – 7
10 reads display – 9
11 Parks 10 = L10, e
Li, e: input by auditor; Li: input by computation
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assigns a compliance fulfilment level of L8, e = 8 to 
the action “operates PMS”. This action points to 
three other actions by include relationships associ-
ated with (8+9+9). The mean value including L8, e 
gives 9. There is an input of an extend relationship 
L4, e = 8 which then gives the final mean value of 
L8
9 8
2
9= + =  (rounded off  to the next integer).
Every actor is assigned to an impact value of 
recovery ability using Ij dj, mj, lj, aj.
Step 4 – Evaluation of results and REPV
As a result from Table 4 the actor Driver(Tourist) 
shows lowest resilience properties. The overall 
resilience value of the car park guidance system is 
the mean of all REPV’s, i.e., REPVsyst = 56 indicat-
ing a system with medium resilience.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In view of extended socio-technical system anal-
ysis, developing a closed resilience assessment 
approach is subject of research (cf. (Mock and Zip-
per 2017). However, this research only makes sense 
if  the understanding of resilience finally results in 
a different approach as already established by the 
concepts of, e.g., risk, BCM and availability. From 
the author’s experience, discussion about resiliency 
often follows synonymous paths as already given 
by these established concepts (cf. (Leksin et al. 
2018)).).
On the other hand, resilience assessment meth-
odology is in its beginnings and still beyond entre-
preneurial interests and has not fixed as state of 
technology yet. Thus, the paper is understood as 
a step toward utilisation of resilience assessments 
of complex systems. For this, a simple REPV is 
defined and the assessment process uses standard-
ised system representation by UCD, which prop-
erly differentiates between actions and actors. This 
property covers well the inclusion of socio-technical 
aspects, where actors are carriers of major proper-
ties of resilience (e.g., learning). They are integral 
parts of the audited system, which is then becomes 
describable as a socio-technical system. By defin-
ing rules to quantify UCDs, the proposed resilience 
assessment approach opens paths for software tool 
development in order to support resilience assess-
ment audits of, e.g., infrastructural systems. The 
case study serves as a proof of concept.
Discussions at ESREL conference in 2017 have 
given rise to fears that the inclusion and detailed 
understanding of the technical functioning of 
(infrastructural) systems could be neglected in 
resilience assessments. The use of UCD provide a 
practical way out of this situation, since UCDs are 
based on comprehensive descriptions of actions, 
actors and their relationships supporting a sys-
temic analysis approach.
The proposed concept of system assessment 
supports auditors to check to what extend infra-
structural systems are resilient. However, the 
approach still needs verification of quantification 
rules, which are presumably too simplistic. The 
approach also needs an extended review based on 
a broader application example. Further develop-
ments consider the inclusion of complexity meas-
ures in order to increase the meaningfulness of 
UCD quantification.
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